巴菲特投资学之于中国（双语）

　　Who should manage Buffett's billions? Or China's?

　　应由谁来管理巴菲特抑或中国的亿万资金？

　　WHEN Warren Buffett took over a fading textile company named Berkshire Hathaway in 1965, Mao Zedong was still plotting his Cultural Revolution, which forced anyone suspected of capitalist tendencies into crushing manual labour. From these rather different points of departure, both Mr Buffett and the People's Republic of China have arrived at a similar dilemma. Mr Buffett is now groping to replace himself as head of a company that has become, in essence, a $170 billion investment fund. The Chinese government meanwhile has yet to name the chief of its own, outsized investment fund, which will be split off from its $1 trillion-worth of foreign-exchange reserves.

　　1965年，当沃伦.巴菲特接手一个叫作伯克希尔.哈撒维的日渐萧条的纺织品公司时，毛泽东还在策划文革，强迫任何被怀疑有资本主义倾向的人接受艰苦劳改。虽然起点大相径庭，但是巴菲特和中国却都陷入了相似的进退两难之境。巴菲特正寻找接班人来接替其公司领袖位置，该公司实质上相当于1700亿美元投资基金。此时，中国政府则将任命主管来管理从其价值达1万亿美元的外汇储备中分离出来的巨额投资基金。

　　The predicaments facing Mr Buffett, the consummate capitalist, and the Chinese government, still avowedly communist, meet many levels. Both are loss-averse; both have concerns about the dollar; neither can do much in Chinese currency (Berkshire by law, though it has managed to lose money speculating in yuan; China by mission). Both also suffer from their size. Whatever they hope to buy tends to become pricey because they are buying it. As Berkshire's fame and weight has increased, its returns have shrunk.

　　彻头彻尾的资本家巴菲特和仍公开承认是共产主义的中国所面临的困境在很多层面上交汇。两方都规避损失、关注美元；两方都无法在人民币问题上大有作为（伯克希尔公司是出于法律原因，虽然其仍“成功”在人民币投机买卖上亏损；中国则是出于使命原因）。两方都因规模而处于不利地位。无论两方想购买什么，该物品都会因其购买而变得价格昂贵。随着伯克希尔公司名誉和分量的提升，其回报反而缩水了。

　　And yet, despite these handicaps, both aspire to large returns. For Berkshire, a publicly listed company, this goes without saying. It is also true for the new Chinese fund, however. Qu Hongbin, chief China economist at HSBC, says the fund will probably be charged the one-year bond rate of about 3% for the assets it manages. But because its funds will not be denominated in Chinese currency, it will also have to compensate for the appreciation of the yuan, which Mr Qu expects to be 3-5% a year. On top of that will be management costs of 1-2%. In sum, the fund may have to produce double-digit returns, which would not be that different from Berkshire's. This may cause it to hold the same kind of volatile assets, such as equities, commodities and junk debt.

　　尽管障碍重重，两方都仍热盼取得高额回报。对伯克希尔这一上市公司来说，这不言而喻。然而，对中国新成立的基金来说也是如此。汇丰银行首席中国经济学家屈宏斌表示，根据其管理的资产，该基金可能将被收取大约3%的1年期债卷利率。而且由于其基金不会以人民币记价，它也将需要补偿人民币升值的影响。屈宏斌预计人民币每年将升值3-5%。除此之外该基金还有1—2%的管理费用。总而言之，该基金可能需要创造两位数利润，这将与伯克希尔公司的利润相差不大。这也许会使得该基金持有同种类的波动资产，例如股票、商品或垃圾债券。

　　Both Berkshire and Beijing share some advantages as well. Berkshire is seen as a buyer of choice, Mr Buffett says, by many owners of good, non-public companies. Dodgy governments, rich in resources and eager for loans, may likewise view China's government as a creditor of choice. Its fund may also be an attractive investor for companies seeking to do business in China. Wal-Mart, for example, a large holding of Berkshire's, is expanding in China but would probably have an easier time if the government had a stake in its success.

　　伯克希尔公司和中国也都有同样的优势。巴菲特表示很多好的私有公司都认为伯克希尔公司是最好的买家。同样的，那些资源丰富、渴求贷款而老奸巨猾的政府也可能认为中国政府是最好的债权人。对意图在中国发展生意的公司来说，该基金也可能成为富有吸引力的投资者。例如，伯克希尔公司的大股东沃尔玛正在中国扩张。但若中国政府能从其成功获利，其扩张将更为简单。

　　But Berkshire and the China fund do differ in two big ways. The first is the type of person they will employ. Mr Buffett wants an independent soul who will make contrarian calls; China is rumoured already to have chosen a fund manager who clocked up many years at its finance ministry—guaranteeing his lack of independence. A contrarian streak is a virtue on Wall Street; it can be a vice in Beijing.

　　但是，伯克希尔公司和中国基金在两方面大相径庭。其一在于两方将雇佣的人员。巴菲特期望雇用敢于与大众相悖的充满独立精神的人；而传闻说中国已选择了个蜗居在其财政部多年因而绝对缺乏独立性的基金管理者。在美国金融界，稍许与大众相悖的精神是种美德；而在中国的话，这却可能是缺陷。

　　The second difference is more subtle. Chinese officials suggest the fund will be expected to do “good” things, by valuing social and political returns, as well as financial ones. Mr Buffett has split these responsibilities. Berkshire's goal is to make money. If shareholders also want to do good, they can give their profits away, as Mr Buffett has pledged to do with his own. As a result, his successor has a clearer mandate and a better chance of success.

　　第二处不同更为微妙。中国官员提出通过衡量社会和政治回报及金融回报，期待该基金被用于“行善”。而巴菲特则将这些责任分离开来。伯克希尔公司的目标是赢利。如果股东也想行善，他们可以捐献自己得到的利润，正如巴菲特承诺要捐献他得到的利润。所以，巴菲特的接班人有更明确的指示和更大的机会取得成功。

　　Whether China's more muddled effort can also succeed is less sure. A better approach might be to free its currency a bit, slow its accumulation of reserves and thus avoid the conundrum of how to invest them. China's government once wanted no truck with big capitalists like Mr Buffett. Now it thinks it can outdo them.

　　中国较为混乱无序的努力是否也能成功，这就不那么确定了。略微放松人民币的管制、放慢储备积累以避免不知如何投资的难题可能是个更好的方法。中国政府曾希望不与巴菲特等大资本家往来。现在，中国又认为可以超越这些大资本家。