中国如何解决房地产难题（双语）

　　Wen Jiabao paid an unusual visit to the city of Wenzhou during the recent national holiday. Accompanied by the head of the Peoples Bank of China, the finance minister and other senior officials, China’s premier went to assess the surge in informal lending to the city’s 450,000 small consumer product and export companies as well as property developers, many of which can no longer get cheap finance from state-owned banks and are failing. With property prices in the secondary market down 10 percent since June, Wenzhou’s problems shed light on China’s newest economic problem – a faltering property market.

　　国庆节期间，中国总理温家宝对温州进行了一次非同寻常的视察。在中国人民银行行长、财政部长和其他高官的陪同下，温家宝考察了当地45万家小型消费品和出口企业以及房地产开发商民间贷款飙升的情况——许多企业无法再像过去那样从国有银行获得廉价贷款，因此濒临破产。自今年6月以来温州二手房价格已经下降10%，因此其问题突显出中国面临的最新经济问题：房地产市场萎靡不振。

　　What happens if the 13 percent of GDP accounted for by property investment stalls or falls? Property is one of the main symbols and causes of urban wealth and is a key driver of industries including cement and steel. Property developers in China are faced with a fall in prices and transaction volumes, which in 20 big cities are about a third lower than a year ago. Depressed share prices are fueling fears that the property bubble is about to burst.

　　如果为国内生产总值(GDP)贡献13%的房地产投资停滞或下降，将会出现什么情况？房产是城市居民财富的主要象征和来源之一，也是包括水泥和钢材在内多个行业发展的主要驱动因素。中国房地产开发商面临量价齐跌的局面——20个大城市的房地产交易量已同比下降三成左右。而低迷的房地产股票价格也使人们担心房地产泡沫即将破裂。

　　The good news is that China managed a property slowdown successfully in 2004 without far-reaching macroeconomic consequences. And the bubble story assumes, often mistakenly, that local anecdotes of speculative activity and oversupply are national. It also ignores rising household incomes, urban house price-to-income ratios and rising demand for new and refurbished homes. A shake-out of weak developers and property assets, and some recapitalisation of banks are all manageable.

　　好消息是，2004年中国曾在没有对宏观经济造成严重影响的情况下成功地放缓了房地产行业的增长。认为中国房地产存在泡沫的人经常错误地认定，房地产投机活动和过度供应是一个全国现象。他们也忽视了中国家庭收入日益增长，城市房价收入比和人们对新房和改善性住房的需求日益上升等事实。实力较弱开发商的出局和房价的下跌，以及一些银行的资本重组都在可控范围之内。

　　The bad news is that China has a big problem with leverage in local and provincial governments, which are responsible for infrastructure and land development. This has been likened locally to China’s sub-prime equivalent.

　　坏消息是，中国负责基础设施和土地开发的地方和省级政府存在严重的杠杆贷款问题。这些贷款一直被比作中国的次贷。

　　Local governments have significant exposure to property values and collateral and are heavily-indebted with liabilities of at least 30 percent of GDP. Many are facing cash-flow problems and are prone to default, with large refinancings and repayments due in the next two years. Some Rmb3,000bn of bad local government loans, or 8 percent of GDP, are being scrutinised by regulators and the National Audit Bureau. A spate of failed land auctions, falls in land transactions and weakness in property prices could have far bigger consequences for China’s capitalist model.

　　中国地方政府在房地产价值和抵押品上拥有巨大敞口，背负的巨额债务至少占到GDP的30%。许多地方政府今后两年需要进行大规模的再融资、偿还大量债务，因此面临现金流问题，很可能出现违约。监管机构和国家审计署正在审查地方政府约3万亿元人民币（占GDP的8%）的坏账。一系列土地流拍、土地交易量下降和房价下跌可能对中国的资本模式造成深远得多的影响。

　　China has the classic symptoms of a typical investment bust, notably a steady deterioration in the quality of investment and financing. A rise in the investment share of GDP to 50 percent and signs of overcapacity in the construction and steel sectors should not be ignored. The rising ratio of the capital stock to output means that ever greater investment is needed to sustain GDP growth.

　　中国拥有典型投资崩盘的典型症状，突出表现在投资和融资质量逐步下降。投资占GDP的比例已上升至50%，建筑和钢材行业产能过剩，这些都是不容忽视的迹象。资本存量与产出的比率日益上升意味着，中国需要越来越多的投资来保持GDP的增长。

　　Beijing has to rebalance its investment-centric, credit-hungry economic model to one built round household consumption. But this is complex. It involves a redistribution of income from capital and profits to labour and wages; radical changes in the role of the exchange rate, interest rates and capital markets; and strategies to counter the high propensity to save by households, corporates and central government. It is also politically divisive because power and economic privilege have to be wrested from party elites, state enterprises and banks, and given to new beneficiaries such as private companies, households, college graduates and rural migrant workers, the last of which has become increasingly restive.

　　中国政府必须将其以投资为中心、高度依赖信贷的经济增长模式调整为以家庭消费为基础的发展模式，但这是一件很复杂的事情。涉及到对资本收入和企业盈利进行二次分配，用来支付劳动力成本，提高工人薪资水平；彻底改变汇率、利率和资本市场扮演的角色；制定战略，让家庭、企业和央行改变喜欢储蓄的倾向。它还会导致政治分化，因为政党精英、国有企业和银行的权力和经济特权必须被剥夺，让私人企业、家庭、大学毕业生和农民工等新群体受益。而农民工已经变得越来越难以管理。

　　Mr Wen continues to stress that the rebalancing of the country’s economy is of paramount importance to China, and to the global economy. We should wish China well in this endeavour. It needs to continue to put the credit and investment genies back in the bottle and pursue economic, legal and political reforms. Beijing’s forthcoming leadership transition does not make the timing propitious. The political will for swifter and more effective rebalancing is not convincing. Last week’s announcement of easier credit and tax policies for smaller companies will probably be followed by easier economic and credit policies and new investments this winter as weaker exports lead to slower growth. That might be good news for some, but not for rebalancing and economic stability.

　　温家宝一直强调，中国经济再平衡对中国和全球经济来说极其重要。我们应该希望中国在这方面有所作为。中国需要坚持努力，把信贷和投资冲动这两个魔鬼塞回瓶子里去，并在经济、法律和政治领域开展改革。中国领导层即将换届，因此目前并非很好的改革时机。加快推出更有效的经济再平衡措施的政治意愿并不强烈。上周中国政府宣布放松对小企业的信贷和税收政策，而随着出口下降导致增长放缓，今年冬天政府很可能会实施较宽松的经济和信贷政策，并进行新的投资。对某些人而言这可能是好消息，但对经济再平衡和稳定而言却并非如此。